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Abstract. Geneticists prefer to store patients’ aligned, raw genomic data, in addi-
tion to their variant calls (compact and summarized form of the raw data), mainly
because of the immaturity of bioinformatic algorithms and sequencing platforms.
Thus, we propose a privacy-preserving system to protect the privacy of aligned, raw
genomic data. The raw genomic data of a patient includes millions of short reads,
each comprised of between 100 and 400 nucleotides (genomic letters). We propose
storing these short reads at a biobank in encrypted form. The proposed scheme
enables a medical unit (e.g., a pharmaceutical company or a hospital) to privately
retrieve a subset of the short reads of the patients (which include a definite range
of nucleotides depending on the type of the genetic test) without revealing the na-
ture of the genetic test to the biobank. Furthermore, the proposed scheme lets the
biobank mask particular parts of the retrieved short reads if (i) some parts of the
provided short reads are out of the requested range, or (ii) the patient does not give
consent to some parts of the provided short reads (e.g., parts revealing sensitive
diseases). We evaluate the proposed scheme to show the amount of unauthorized
genomic data leakage it prevents. Finally, we implement the proposed scheme and
assess its practicality.
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1 Introduction
Genomics holds great promise for better predictive medicine and improved diag-
noses. However, genomics also comes with a risk to privacy [1, 2] (e.g., revelation
of an individual’s genetic properties due to the leakage of his genomic data). An
increasing number of medical units (pharmaceutical companies or hospitals) are
willing to outsource the storage of genomes generated in clinical trials. Acting as
a third party, a biobank could store patients’ genomic data that would be used by
the medical units for clinical trials. In the meantime, the patient can also benefit
from the stored genomic information by interrogating his own genomic data, to-
gether with his family doctor, for specific genetic predispositions, susceptibilities
and metabolical capacities. The major challenge here is to preserve the privacy
of patients’ genomic data while allowing the medical units to operate on specific
parts of the genome (for which they are authorized).
Sequence alignment/map (SAM and its binary version BAM) files are the de
facto standards used to store the aligned4, raw genomic data generated by next-
generation DNA sequencers and bioinformatic algorithms. There are hundreds of
millions of short reads (each including between 100 and 400 nucleotides) in the
SAM file of a patient. Typically, each nucleotide is present in several short reads in
order to have sufficiently high coverage of each patient’s DNA. In the rest of this
paper, we present our work focusing on the SAM files, as it is clearer to present the
proposed methods by using this human-readable format. However, the proposed
4 Alignment is with respect to the reference genome, which is assembled by the scientists.
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scheme has no reliance on this particular format; our proposed algorithms can also
be applied to other data formats that are used to store the raw genomic data (e.g.,
BAM).
In general, geneticists prefer storing aligned, raw genomic data of the patients
(i.e., their SAM files), in addition to their variant calls (which include each nu-
cleotide on the DNA sequence once, hence is much more compact) due to the
following reasons: (i) Bioinformatic algorithms and sequencing platforms for vari-
ant calling are currently not yet mature, and hence geneticists prefer to observe
each nucleotide in several short reads. (ii) If a patient carries a disease, which
causes specific variations in the diseased cells (e.g., cancer), his DNA sequence in
his healthy cells will be different from those diseased. Such variations can be mis-
classified as sequencing errors by only looking at the patient’s variant calls (rather
than his short reads). And (iii) due to the rapid evolution of genomic research,
geneticists do not know enough to decide which information should really be kept
and what is superfluous, hence they prefer to store all outcome of the sequencing
process as SAM files.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing works on genomic privacy
addresses the issue of private processing of aligned, raw genomic data (i.e., SAM
files), which is crucial to enable the use of genomic data in clinical trials. Therefore,
in this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving system for the storage, retrieval and
processing of the SAM files. In a nutshell, the proposed scheme stores the encrypted
SAM files of the patients at a biobank and it provides the requested range of
nucleotides (on the DNA sequence) to a medical unit while protecting the patients’
genomic privacy. It is important to note that the proposed scheme enables the
privacy-preserving processing of the SAM files both for individual treatment (when
the medical unit is embodied in a hospital) and for genetic research (when the
medical unit is embodied in a pharmaceutical company). The main contributions
of this paper are summarized in the following:
1. We develop a privacy-preserving framework for the retrieval of encrypted short
reads (in the SAM files) from the biobank without revealing the scope of the
request to the biobank.
2. We develop an efficient system for obfuscating (i.e., masking) specific parts of
the encrypted short reads that are out of the requested range of the medical
unit (or that the patient prefers to keep secret) at the biobank before providing
them to the medical unit.
3. We show the benefit of masking by evaluating the information leak to the
medical unit, with and without the masking is in place.
4. We implement the proposed privacy-preserving system by using real genomic
data, evaluate its efficiency, and show its practicality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we summarize
the existing work on genomic privacy. In Section 3, we give a brief background on
genomics (particularly on SAM files). In Section 4, we give an overview of the
proposed scheme. In Section 5, we discuss the potential options and constraints
about the design of our proposed scheme. In Section 6, we discuss the threat model
and our security considerations. In Section 7, we describe the proposed scheme in
detail. In Section 8, we evaluate our proposed scheme using real genomic data. In
Section 9, we discuss about the implementation of the proposed scheme and its
practicality. In Section 10, we conclude the paper.
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2 Related Work
We can put the research on genomic privacy in three main categories: (i) re-
identification of anonymized genomic data, (ii) cryptographic algorithms to protect
genomic data, and (iii) private clinical genomics.
Homer et al. [3] prove that de-identification is an ineffective way to protect
the privacy of genomic data, which is also supported by other works [4–6]. Most
recently, Gymrek et al. [7] show how they identified DNAs of several individuals
who participated in scientific studies. Fienberg et al. [8] propose using differential
privacy to protect the identities of scientific study participants, however this ap-
proach reduces the accuracy of the research results. Some pieces of work also focus
on protecting the privacy of genomic data and on preserving utility in medical tests
such as (i) search of a particular pattern in the DNA sequence [9,10], (ii) comparing
the similarity of DNA sequences [11–13], and (iii) performing statistical analysis
on several DNA sequences [14]. Moreover, we propose privacy-preserving schemes
for medical tests and personalized medicine methods that use patients’ genomic
data [15–17].5 For privacy-preserving clinical genomics, a group of researchers pro-
poses to outsource some costly computations to a public cloud or semi-trusted
service provider [18,19].
As we discussed before, none of the aforementioned efforts on genomic privacy
focus on the processing of aligned, raw genomic data. Therefore, in this work, we
focus on private storage, retrieval, and processing of raw genomic data.
3 Genomic Background
The DNA sequence data produced by DNA sequencing consists of millions of short
reads, each typically including between 100 and 400 nucleotides (A,C,G,T), de-
pending on the type of sequencer. These reads are randomly sampled from a human
genome. Each read is then bioinformatically treated and positioned (aligned) to its
genetic location to produce a so-called SAM file. There are hundreds of millions of
short reads in the SAM file of one patient.
The privacy-sensitive fields of a short read are (i) its position with respect to
the reference genome, (ii) its cigar string (CS), and (iii) its content (including the
nucleotides from {A,T,G,C}).
A short read’s position denotes the position of the first aligned nucleotide in
its content, with respect to the reference genome. The position of a short read is in
the form Li,j = 〈xi|yj〉, where xi represents the chromosome number (xi ∈ [1, 23]
as there are 23 chromosomes in the human genome) and yj represents the position
of its first aligned nucleotide on chromosome xi (yj ∈ [1, 240M] as the maximum
number of nucleotides on a chromosome is around 240 million). The cigar string
(CS) of a short read expresses the variations in the content of the short read.
The CS includes pairs of nucleotide lengths and the associated operations. The
operations in the CS indicate some properties about content of the short read such
as which nucleotides align with the reference, which are deleted from the reference,
and which are insertions that are not in the reference (without revealing the content
of the short read). Finally, the content of a short read includes the nucleotides.
We provide more details about the SAM files in [20]. That is, we illustrate the real
format of a short read, we give the descriptions of the fields in the CS and we give
5 More information about our activities in the field of genomic privacy can be found at:
http://lca.epfl.ch/projects/genomic-privacy/.
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an example about how the content of a short read looks and how the CS of the
corresponding short read is generated.
There are several types of DNA variations in the human genome, among which
the single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) is the most common. A SNP is a po-
sition in the genome holding a nucleotide that varies between individuals. Recent
discoveries show that the susceptibility of a patient to several diseases can be com-
puted from his SNPs [21]. Thus, we focus on the SNPs of a patient when evaluating
the information leakage in Section 8.
4 Overview of the Proposed Solution
In this work, we develop a privacy-preserving system for the storage, retrieval and
processing of the SAM files (details are in Section 7).
We assume that the sequencing and encryption of the genomes are done at a
certified institution (CI), which is a trusted entity. We note that having such a
trusted entity cannot be avoided as the sequencing has to be done at some in-
stitution to obtain the SAM files of the patients. Each part (position, CS, and
content) of each short read (in the SAM file) is encrypted (via a different encryp-
tion scheme) after the sequencing, and encrypted SAM files of the patients are
stored at a biobank. We assume that SAM files are stored at the biobank by using
pseudonyms; this way, the biobank cannot associate the conducted genetic tests
and the medical unit (MU), which conduct these tests, with the real identities
of the patients. We note that a private company (e.g., cloud storage service) or
the government could play the role of the biobank. There are potentially multi-
ple MUs in the system, and each MU is an approved institution (by the medical
authorities). Furthermore, we assume that an MU is a broad unit consisting of
many sub-units (e.g., physicians or specialized clinics) that can potentially request
nucleotides from any parts of a patient’s genome.
The cryptographic keys of the patients are stored on a key manager by using
the patient’s pseudonym (which does not require the participation of the patient
in the protocol). From here on, we assume the existence of a masking and key
manager (MK) in the system to store the cryptographic keys of the patients. The
MK can also be embodied in the government or a private company.
4.1 Privacy-Preserving Retrieval of the Short Reads
When the MU requests a specific range of nucleotides (on the DNA sequence of
one or multiple patients), the biobank provides all the short reads that include
at least one nucleotide from the requested range through the MK. During this
process, the patient does not want to reveal his complete genome to the MU, to the
biobank, or to the MK. Furthermore, it is not desirable for the biobank to learn the
requested range of nucleotides (as the biobank can infer the nature of the genetic
test from this requested range). Thus, we develop a privacy-preserving system for
the retrieval of the short reads by the MU. The proposed scheme provides the short
reads that include the requested range of nucleotides to the MU without revealing
the positions of these short reads to the biobank.
To achieve this goal, we first modify the structure of the genome by permuting
the positions of the short reads, and then we use order preserving encryption
(OPE) on the positions of the short reads (in the SAM file). OPE is a deterministic
encryption scheme whose encryption function preserves numerical ordering of the
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Fig. 1. Parts to be masked in the short
reads for out-of-range content.
Fig. 2. Parts to be masked in a short read
based on patient’s consent. The patient does
not give consent to reveal the dark parts of
the short read.
plaintexts [22,23].6 Thus, OPE enables the encryption of the positions of the short
reads and preserves the numerical ordering of the plaintext positions.
4.2 Masking of the Short Reads
We prevent the leakage of extra information in the short reads to the MU by
masking the encrypted short reads at the biobank (before sending them to the
MU). As each short read includes between 100 and 400 nucleotides, some provided
short reads might include information out of the MU’s requested range of genomic
data, as in Fig. 1. Similarly, some provided short reads might contain privacy-
sensitive SNPs of the patient (which would reveal the patient’s susceptibilities to
privacy-sensitive diseases such as Alzheimer’s), hence the patient might not give
consent to reveal such parts, as in Fig. 2. From here on, the nucleotides that
the patient does not consent to reveal will be referred to as the non-consented
nucleotides.
To achieve this goal, we mask certain parts of the encrypted short reads at the
biobank, without decrypting them using an efficient algorithm. It is important to
note that after the short reads are decrypted at the MU, the MU is not able to
determine the nucleotides at the masked positions.
5 Design Constraints and Options
For security, efficiency, and availability, we propose storing the SAM files at a
biobank instead of at the MU. Extreme precaution is needed for the storage of
genomic data due to its sensitivity. We assume that the biobank is more “security-
aware” than an MU, hence it can protect the stored genomic data against a hacker
better than an MU (yet, attacks against the biobank cannot be ruled out, as
we discuss next). Indeed, this assumption is supported by recent serious medical
data breaches from various MUs [24]. Furthermore, by storing the SAM files at
one biobank, multiple MUs can reliably access the patients’ genomic data from it
(instead of each MU individually storing that same large amount of data) at any
time.
We propose outsourcing the storage of the cryptographic keys (of the patients)
to the MK instead of storing them on a patient’s device (e.g., a smartphone) due to
the following two reasons: (i) It is not realistic to assume that all the patients will
have the sufficient precautions to protect their cryptographic keys (which will pos-
sibly be stored in their smartphones), and (ii) if the keys are stored on a patient’s
device, operations involving the patient are done on the MU’s (e.g., the hospital)
computer via the patient’s device, hence this approach requires the involvement
6 We briefly present the cryptographic tools we use in this paper in [20].
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of the patient in the operation (e.g., physical presence at the hospital). Whereas,
following our discussions with geneticists and medical doctors, we conclude that
the patient’s involvement in the genetic tests is not desired for the practicality of
the protocol (e.g., when a pharmaceutical company conducts genetic research on
thousands of patients).
In this work, we use OPE instead of private information retrieval (PIR), search-
able encryption [25, 26], or oblivious RAM (O-RAM) storage [27] techniques for
the privacy-preserving retrieval of the short reads for the following reasons: (i) As
we discussed before, the short reads are randomly sampled from the genomes of the
patients, and hence the positions of the short reads vary in each patient’s genome.
The MU typically asks for a particular range of nucleotides on the DNA sequence
of one or multiple patients. However, these requested nucleotides reside in different
short reads for each patient and the MU does not know which nucleotide is stored
in which short reads of each patient (storing the positions of all short reads and the
list of nucleotides they accommodate for each patient at every MU requires signifi-
cant storage overhead). Thus, the MU does not know exactly which short reads to
ask for, and hence PIR or searchable encryption techniques would be impractical
for our scenario. And (ii) although O-RAM techniques completely hide the data
access patterns from the server (biobank), even the most efficient implementations
of O-RAM introduce high storage overhead to the client (patient) and introduce
about 25 times more overhead with respect to non-oblivious storage [28].
6 Threat Model and Security Considerations
We consider the following models for the attacker:
• A curious party at the biobank (or a hacker who breaks into the biobank), who
tries (i) to infer the genomic sequence of a patient from his stored genomic data
and (ii) to associate the type of the genetic test (e.g., the disease for which the
patient is being tested, which can be inferred from the nucleotides requested by
the MU) with the patient being tested.
• A curious party at the MK (or a hacker who breaks into the MK), who tries
(i) to infer the genomic sequence of a patient from his stored cryptographic keys
and the information provided by the biobank and (ii) to associate the type of the
genetic test with the patient being tested.
• A curious party at an MU, who can be considered either as an attacker who
hacks into the MU’s system or a disgruntled employee who has access to the MU’s
database. The goal of such an attacker is to obtain the private genomic data of a
patient for which it is not authorized.
Apart from (potentially) being curious, we assume that the biobank, the MK, and
the MUs are honest organizations. That is, the biobank, the MK, and the MUs
honestly follow the protocols and provide correct information to the other parties.
In the following, we discuss how we prevent the aforementioned attacks.
SAM files are encrypted (at the CI) and stored at the biobank to avoid the
biobank from inferring the genomic data of the patients (details about encryption
are in Section 7.1). To avoid the biobank from associating the conducted genetic
tests with the patients, we hide both the real identities of the patients (using
pseudonyms) and the types of the conducted tests (using OPE on the positions
of the short reads) from the biobank. Note, however, that the biobank knows the
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real identity of an MU to make sure that the request comes from a valid source.7
To avoid the MK from associating the genetic tests with the patients, we do not
reveal the identities of the MUs or the patients to the MK. Alternatively (to further
increase the security of the scheme), a group signature scheme can be integrated
for the communication between the MU and the MK. By this way, the MK can
also make sure that a request is coming from an authorized MU, without knowing
the real identity of the corresponding MU.
Even though we encrypt the positions of the short reads (using OPE) to hide
the conducted genetic tests from the biobank, the biobank might still infer the
approximate positions of the short reads as a result of using OPE. The biobank
does not see the exact bounds of the queries, but it can sort all short reads of
the stored genome based on their offsets, which certainly gives it a rough idea
which short read contains which nucleotides, and hence which genetic test is being
performed. To avoid this, for each patient, we re-define the positions of the short
reads before encrypting them using OPE (as discussed in detail in Section 7.1).
We also make sure that the MK cannot infer the genomic data of the patients
by using the information it receives from the biobank and the cryptographic keys it
stores. Indeed, as we will discuss in Section 7.2, we only provide the positions and
the cigar strings (CSs) of a subset of the short reads (depending on the range of
nucleotides requested by the MU) to the MK, which is not enough to infer the nu-
cleotides residing in the contents of corresponding short reads (the contents of the
short reads are never transferred to the MK). By only analyzing the CS (without
having access to the content), the MK can learn the locations of some insertions
and deletions in the patient’s genome (but not the contents of these insertions or
deletions). However, the MK cannot infer the locations or contents of the patient’s
privacy-sensitive point mutations (e.g., SNPs), which are typically used to evalu-
ate the predispositions of the patients for various diseases. These privacy-sensitive
point mutations can only be inferred when the CS is used together with the content
of the short read (which is not revealed to the MK). Furthermore, as we mentioned
in Section 4, by masking the encrypted short reads before providing them to the
MU, we avoid the MU acquiring more genomic data than it requests.
Collusion between the parties (i.e., the biobank, the MK, and an MU) is not
allowed in our threat model and we assume that laws could enforce this. Finally,
all communication between the parties are encrypted to protect the system from
an external attacker.
7 Privacy-Preserving Processing of Raw Genomic Data
7.1 Cryptographic Keys and Encryption of the Short Reads
As we discussed before, the position of a short read is in the form Li,j = 〈xi|yj〉,
where xi represents the chromosome (xi ∈ [1, 23]) and yj represents the position
of the short read on chromosome xi (yj ∈ [1, 240M]). Therefore, we represent the
position of a short read as a 35-bit number, where the first 5 bits represent the
chromosome number and the remaining 30 bits represent the position of the short
read in the corresponding chromosome. If the positions of the short reads were
7 Knowing the MU (e.g., the name of the hospital) the biobank could de-anonymize an individual
using other sources (e.g., by associating the time of the test and the location of the MU with
the location patterns of the victim). Thus, we hide the types of the conducted tests from the
biobank to avoid it associating the conducted genetic test with the individual.
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encrypted following this representation, the biobank could infer the approximate
positions of the short reads as a result of using OPE (as discussed in Section 6).
<Chromosome> | <Posi!on on the chromosome>
1 | 1-230M 2 | 1-240M …
PERMUTE
MAP
DIVIDE
1 | 200M-230M & 2 | 1-10M 1 | 1-40M 2 | 210M-240M & 3 | 1-10M 
91 122 11 26 232 81 201 221 132 171 16 43 …
11 12 13 14 15 16 21 22 23 24 25 26 …
<1> 91 <2> 122 <3> 11 <4> 26 <5> 232 <6> 81 <7> 201 <8> 221 <9> 132 <10> 171 <11> 16 <12> 43 …
<3> <1 | 1-40M>  
<4><2 | 210M-240M> & <4><3 | 1-10M> 
<11><1 | 200M-230M> & <11><2 | 1-10M> 
Fig. 3. Division, permutation and mapping of the posi-
tions on the whole genome.
To avoid this, we first di-
vide the positions on the whole
genome into parts of equal
lengths, permute these parts,
and then modify the positions
in each part based on the per-
mutation. In Fig. 3, we show
such an example, in which the
positions on the genome are di-
vided into parts of length 40 mil-
lion (totaling 75 parts as there
are 3 billion nucleotides in the
human genome). For example,
chromosome 1 is divided into 6
parts (11, 12, . . . , 16), where the
last part includes positions from both the first and second chromosomes. After
division, all parts are permuted and mapped to different positions. As a result
of the new mapping, the new position of a short read at Li,j = 〈xi|yj〉 becomes
M(Li,j) = 〈k〉〈xi|yj〉, where M(.) is the mapping function for patient P, and k
is the mapping of the corresponding part. For example, the position of a short
read located in the first part of the first chromosome (part 11 in Fig. 3) becomes
M(Li,j) = 〈3〉〈xi|yj〉 after the permutation and mapping. We note that as a result
of the new positioning, we add κ bits (to represent the mapping) in front of the
original positions of each short read (κ = 7 for the example in Fig. 3 as the posi-
tions on the genome are divided into 75 parts). Thus, for each patient, we re-define
the positions of the short reads based on this new positioning, before encrypting
the positions of the short reads using OPE. By doing so, we also change the or-
dering of the encrypted positions of the short reads. As a consequence, a curious
party at the biobank cannot infer which part of the patient’s genome is queried
by the MU from the stored (encrypted) positions of the short reads. Finally, we
assume that the MK keeps the mapping table MP (showing the mapping of each
part in each chromosome) for each patient P. Note that as the permutation is done
differently for each patient, the biobank cannot infer if two different patients are
having a similar genetic test.
The different parts of each short read are encrypted as follows: (i) The positions
of the short reads are encrypted using order preserving encryption (OPE), (ii)
the cigar string (CS) of each short read is encrypted using a semantically secure
symmetric encryption function (SE), and (iii) the content of each short read is
encrypted using a stream cipher (SC). We note that an SC also provides semantic
security, and although we really need an SC for the encryption of the content, one
can also use an SC for the encryption of the CS.
We represent the key used for the semantically secure encryption scheme be-
tween two parties i and j as Ki,j. The symmetric OPE key that is used to encrypt
the positions of the short reads of patient P is represented as KOP . Further, the
master key of patient P, which is used to generate the keys of the SC is repre-
sented as MP . We denote K
Ci,j
P as the SC key used to encrypt the content of the
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Posi on (on Ref.) 9 10 11 12 13 14 16 17 * * 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
Content of SR in 
the SAM ﬁle a t g T A A A T G C T A T G C G A G
Plaintext content 
in binary
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Key stream 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Encrypted 
content (XOR)
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Masking vector 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Random masking
string
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
Masked enc. 
content (XOR)
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Decrypted binary
content (XOR)
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Decrypted 
nucleo des
T G C T A A A G G C T G A T G G C A
Properes of the SR
CS of the SR before masking 3S3M1D2M2I3N8M
Posi on of the SR 12
Input parameters
Requested range of nucleo des 10-20
Non-consented posi ons {3,5,11,17,21}
Output parameters CS of the SR a#er masking 3O3M1D1M1O2I3N8O
Encoding nucleo des
A 00
T 01
C 10
G 11
(a)
(b) (c)
Fig. 4. Illustrative example for the encryption, masking and decryption of the content of a short
read (SR). For the clarity of the example, we simplified the format of the short read position (which
is in the form of Li,j = 〈xi|yj〉, as discussed before). The arrows on the right show the inputs of
the corresponding XOR operation. (a) Content of the SR (the 2 stars between positions 17 and
21 represent the positions at which the SR has insertions, G and C), its binary representation
(following the encoding in (b)), the key stream to encrypt the corresponding content, and the
format of the encrypted content (after the binary plaintext content is XOR-ed with the key
stream). Furthermore, following the discussion in Section 7.2, we illustrate the masking vector
generated at the MK considering the range of the requested nucleotides and the patient’s consent
(in (c)), the random masking string for the corresponding masking vector, and the format of
the masked content (generated by XOR-ing the encrypted content with the random masking
string). Finally, we show the format of the decrypted binary content, and the corresponding
decrypted nucleotides. (b) Encoding format of the nucleotides A,T,C, and G. (c) Properties of
the corresponding short read, requested range of nucleotides by the MU, non-consented nucleotides
by the patient, and format of the CS after masking. We provide more details about different letters
in the CS in [20].
short read whose position is Li,j (where Ci,j represents the content of the short
read with position Li,j). We compute K
Ci,j
P = H(MP ,F(Li,j , Si,j), Li,j), where
Li,j is the (starting) position of the corresponding short read (on the DNA se-
quence), Si,j is a random salt to provide different keys for the short reads with
the same positions, and H is a pseudorandom function. Moreover, F(Li,j, Si,j) is
a function that generates a nonce from the position and the random salt of the
corresponding short read. We note that the random salts of the short reads are
stored in plaintext. We represent the public-key encryption of message m under
the public key of i as E(Ki,m), the encryption of message m via a semantically
secure symmetric encryption function (SE) using the symmetric key between i
and j as ESE(Ki,j ,m), and the OPE of message m using the OPE key of P as
EOPE(K
O
P ,m). Furthermore, we represent the SC encryption of the content of a
short read as ESC(K
Ci,j
P , Ci,j), where Ci,j represents the content of the short read
at Li,j. In Fig. 4(a), we illustrate how the content of a short read is translated to
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EOPE( ,POSITION) ESE( ,CS) ESC( ,CONTENT) RAND.SALT
Fig. 5. Format of an encrypted short read. The size
of each field is discussed in Section 9.
plaintext bits and encrypted using
SC (by XOR-ing the content with
the key stream). Finally, in Fig. 5,
we illustrate the format of an en-
crypted short read.8
We assume that the certified institution (CI), where the patient’s DNA is se-
quenced and analyzed, has KOP , MP , and KP,CI (KP,CI is used to encrypt the CSs
of the short reads) for the initial encryption of the patient’s genomic data. These
keys are then deleted from the CI after the sequencing, alignment, and encryption.
We also assume that the patient’s cryptographic keys for symmetric encryption,
OPE, and SC are stored at the MK, and the patient does not participate in the
protocol (except for giving his consent). Thus, for patient P, the MK stores KOP ,
MP , and KP,CI along with the mapping table MP (as discussed before). Finally,
the MU only stores the public key of the MK, KMK .
7.2 Proposed Protocol
Typically, a specialist at the MU (e.g., a physician at the hospital or a specialized
clinic connected to the hospital) requests a range of nucleotides (on the DNA
sequence of one or more patients) from the biobank (either for a personal genetic
test or for clinical research). For simplicity of the presentation, we assume that the
request is for a specific range of nucleotides of patient P. We note that when the
MU is embodied in a pharmaceutical company, the MU does not know the real
identities of the patients (i.e., participants of a clinical trial). Thus, in this case,
the MU asks for a certain range of nucleotides of several pseudonymized patients
from the biobank, who consented to participate in the corresponding clinical trial
(the pseudonyms of these patients are known by the MU or by the biobank, and
the general consent for the corresponding clinical trial is forwarded to the MK for
masking). We illustrate the connections between the parties that are involved in
the protocol in Fig. 6(a). In the following, we describe the steps of the proposed
protocol (these steps are also illustrated in Fig. 6(b)).
• Step 1: The patient (P) provides a sample (e.g., his saliva) along with his
permission to the certified institution (CI) for sequencing. We assume that laws
prevent DNA sequencing of a (stolen) biological sample (e.g., hair) without the
patient’s permission.
• Step 2: The sample is sequenced by the CI. Next, the CI aligns the shorts reads
of the patient with respect to the reference genome and constructs the SAM file
of the patient. The short reads of the patient are also encrypted at the CI (as
discussed in Section 7.1).
• Step 3: The CI sends the encrypted SAM file to the biobank along with the
corresponding pseudonym of the patient. The CI also sends KOP , MP , KP,CI , and
the mapping table MP for patient P directly to the MK via a secure channel (we
do not illustrate this step in Fig. 6). We note that the first 3 steps of the protocol
are executed only once.
• Step 4: A specialized sub-unit at the MU requests nucleotides from the range
[RL, RU ] (RL being the lower bound and RU being the upper bound of the re-
quested range) on the DNA sequence of patient P for a genetic test. We note that
8 We discuss the size of each field (i.e., start and end positions of each field) in the encrypted
short read in Section 9.
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Fig. 6. (a) Connections between the parties in the proposed protocol. (b) The operations and
message exchanges in the proposed protocol.
an access control unit stores the authorizations (i.e., access rights) of the original
request owners (e.g., specialist at a hospital) to different parts of the genomic data.
These access rights of different specialists to the SAM files are defined by the medi-
cal authorities. In our setting, the access control unit is the MU, and the MU checks
the access rights of the original request owner before forwarding the request to the
biobank. Once, the MU verifies that the original request owner has the sufficient
access rights to the requested range of nucleotides, the MU generates a one-time
session key KMK,MU , which will be used for the secure communication between
the MU and the MK (as we do not reveal the real identity of the MU to the MK,
as discussed in Section 6, this key is generated for each session). The MU encrypts
this session key with the public key of the MK to obtain E(KMK ,KMK,MU).
The MU encrypts the lower and upper bounds of the requested range with
KMK,MU to obtain ESE(KMK,MU , RL||RU ) and sends the corresponding request
to the biobank along with the pseudonym of the patient P, the identification of the
MU9, E(KMK ,KMK,MU), and ESE(KMK,MU ,ΩP ), where ΩP is the pseudonymized
consent of the patient.10 The MK uses this pseudonymized consent ΩP to generate
the masking vectors (as in Step 9).
• Step 5: Once the biobank verifies that request comes from a valid source11, it for-
wards ESE(KMK,MU , RL||RU ), and ESE(KMK,MU ,ΩP ), along with the pseudonym
of the patient, and the encrypted session key E(KMK ,KMK,MU) to the MK.
• Step 6: The MK decrypts the session key to obtain KMK,MU and decrypts the
request (ESE(KMK,MU , RL||RU )) to obtain RL and RU . As we discussed before,
the position of a short read is the position of the first aligned nucleotide in its
content. Let Γ be the maximum number of nucleotides in a short read. Then, the
short reads with position in [RL−Γ, RL−1] might also include nucleotides from the
requested range ([RL, RU ]) in their contents. Thus, the MK re-defines the lower
bound of the request as RL − Γ in order to make sure that all the short reads
(which include at least one nucleotide from the requested range of nucleotides) are
9 We reveal the real identity of the MU to the biobank to make sure that the request comes from
a valid source.
10 ΩP denotes the positions on the patient’s genome for which the patient does not give consent
to the original request owner (e.g., specialized sub-unit at the MU). ΩP can be digitally signed
by a medical authority to make sure that its content was not tampered with.
11 We assume that the biobank has a list of valid MUs, whose requests it will answer.
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retrieved by the biobank (as opposed to the lower bound, the MK does not need
to re-define the upper bound of the request).
Next, the MK determines where (RL−Γ) and RU are mapped to following the
mapping table MP of patient P (as discussed in Section 7.1). If both (RL − Γ)
and RU are on the same part (e.g., in Fig. 3), then the MK computes the range
of short read positions (to be retrieved by the biobank) as [M(RL − Γ),M(RU )],
whereM(.) is the mapping function for patient P. Otherwise (if they are not on the
same part), due to the permutation of the parts (in Section 7.1), the MK generates
multiple ranges of short read positions to make sure all short reads including at
least one nucleotide from [RL, RU ] are retrieved by the biobank. For simplicity of
the presentation, we assume (RL − Γ) and RU are on the same part. Finally, the
MK computes the encrypted range [EOPE(K
O
P ,M(RL − Γ)),EOPE(K
O
P ,M(RU ))],
and sends this encrypted range to the biobank (with the pseudonym of P).
• Step 7: The biobank retrieves all the short reads (in the SAM file of patient
P) whose encrypted positions (EOPE(K
O
P ,M(Li,j))) are in [EOPE(K
O
P ,M(RL −
Γ)),EOPE(K
O
P ,M(RU ))], and constructs the set ∆ = {EOPE(K
O
P ,M(Li,j)) :
EOPE(K
O
P ,M(RL − Γ)) ≤ EOPE(K
O
P ,M(Li,j)) ≤ EOPE(K
O
P ,M(RU ))}. As OPE
preserves the numerical ordering of the plaintext positions, the biobank constructs
the set ∆ without accessing the plaintext positions of the short reads.
• Step 8: The biobank provides the encrypted positions in ∆ along with the
corresponding encrypted CSs and the random salt values of the short reads to the
MK.
• Step 9: The MK decrypts the corresponding positions and the CSs of the re-
trieved short reads by using KOP and KP,CI in order to construct the masking
vectors for the biobank. These masking vectors prevent the leakage of out-of-range
content (in Fig. 1) and non-consented nucleotides (in Fig. 2) to the MU, as we
discussed in Section 4.2.
The MK can determine the actual position of a short read from its mapped
position as the MK has the mapping table MP for patient P (i.e., it can infer
Li,j from M(Li,j) using MP ). Using the position and the CS of a short read, the
MK can determine the exact positions of the nucleotides in the content of a short
read (but not the contents of the nucleotides, because the contents are encrypted
and stored at the biobank). Using this information, the MK can determine the
parts in the content of the short read that are out of the requested range [RL, RU ].
Furthermore, the MK can also determine whether the short read includes any
nucleotide positions for which the patient P does not give consent (the patient’s
pseudonymized consent, ΩP , is provided to the MK in Step 5). Therefore, the
MK constructs binary masking vectors indicating the positions in the contents
of the short reads that are needed to be masked by the biobank before sending
the retrieved short reads to the MU. We provide the details of the algorithm to
construct the masking vectors in [20]. In Fig. 4(a), we illustrate how the masking
vector is constructed for the corresponding short read, when the requested range
of nucleotides is [10, 20] and for a given set of nucleotide positions (on the DNA
sequence) for which the patient P does not give consent (as in Fig. 4(c)).
The MK also modifies the CS of each short read (if it is marked for masking)
according to the nucleotides to be masked. That is, the MK modifies the CS such
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that the masked nucleotides are represented with a new operation “O” in the CS.12
By doing so, when the MU receives the short reads (which include the requested
nucleotides), it can see which parts of them are masked (hence which parts of them
it needs to discard for its purposes). In Fig. 4(c), we illustrate how the CS of the
corresponding short read changes as a result of the masking vector in Fig. 4(a).
Then, the MK generates the decryption keys for each short read (whose position
is in ∆) by using the master key of the patient (MP ), positions of the shorts read,
and the random salt values.13
• Step 10: The MK encrypts the positions, the (modified) CSs, and the generated
decryption keys of the contents of the short reads, using KMK,MU . Then, it sends
the masking vectors along with the encrypted positions, CSs and decryption keys
to the biobank. We note that in this step, the MK encrypts the actual positions of
the short reads (e.g., Li,j instead of M(Li,j)) as these positions will be eventually
decrypted and used by the MU, and the MU does not need to know the mapping
table MP of the patient.
• Step 11: The biobank conducts the masking by XOR-ing the bits of the en-
crypted content of each short read (whose position is in ∆) with a random masking
string. Each entry (bit) of the random masking string is assigned as follows: (i)
If the corresponding entry is set for masking in the masking vector, it is assigned
with a random binary value, and (ii) it is assigned with zero, otherwise. We pro-
vide the details of the algorithm to perform the masking at the biobank in [20].
Furthermore, in Fig. 4(a), we illustrate how the masked encrypted content for the
corresponding short read is constructed by XOR-ing the random masking string
with the encrypted content.
• Step 12: Finally, the biobank sends the encrypted positions, CSs and decryption
keys (generated in Step 10 by the MK) along with the masked contents (generated
in Step 11 by the biobank) to the MU. The MU decrypts the received data and
obtains the requested nucleotides of the patient.
8 Evaluation
Focusing on the leakage of genomic data, we evaluate the proposed privacy-
preserving system by using real genomic data to show (i) how the leakage of
genomic data from the short reads threatens the genomic privacy of a patient,
and (ii) how the proposed masking technique helps to prevent this leakage. We
assume that the MU requests a specific range of nucleotides of patient P (e.g., for
a genetic test) from the biobank. In practice, the requested range can include from
one to thousands of nucleotides depending on the type of the genetic test.
First, without the masking in place, we observe the ratio of unauthorized ge-
nomic data (i.e., number of nucleotides provided to the MU that are out of the
requested range) to the authorized data (i.e., number of nucleotides within the
requested range) for various request sizes. For simplicity, we assume that all the
nucleotides within the requested range are considered as consented data (i.e., the
situation in Fig. 2 is not considered); and only those that are out of the requested
range (but still provided to the MU via the short reads) are considered as the
unauthorized data. For the patient’s DNA profile (i.e., SAM file), we use a real
12 Alternatively, the consent of the patient can be used by the MU instead of modifying the CS.
Thus, the MU determines the masked nucleotides from the consent.
13 The generation of the decryption keys for the SC is the same as the generation of the encryption
keys as we discussed in Section 7.1.
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human DNA profile [29] (with an average coverage of 8, meaning each nucleotide
is present, on the average, in 8 short reads in the SAM file, and each short read
includes at most 100 nucleotides) and we randomly choose the ranges of requested
nucleotides from the entire genome of the patient. We illustrate our results in
Fig. 7. We observe that for small request sizes, the amount of leakage (of unautho-
rized data) is very high compared to the size of authorized data. As the leakage
vanishes (e.g., the ratio in Fig. 7 becomes 0) with the proposed masking technique,
we do not show the leakage when the proposed masking technique is in place in
Figs. 7-10.
Using the same DNA profile, we also observe the evolution in the amount
of leaked genomic data over time. For simplicity of the presentation, we assume
slotted time and that the MU conducts a genetic test on the patient at each time
slot (by requesting a particular range of nucleotides from a random part of his
genome). In Fig. 8, we illustrate the amount of genomic data (i.e., number of
nucleotides) that is leaked to the MU in 100 time-slots. The jumps in the number
of leaked nucleotides (at some time-slots) is due to the fact that some requests
might retrieve more short reads comprised of more out-of-range nucleotides. As
before, leakage becomes 0 when masking is in place, which shows the crucial role
of the proposed scheme.
As discussed in Section 3, leakage of the nucleotides at the single nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs) positions poses more risk for the genomic privacy of the
patient. Therefore, we also study the information leakage, focusing on the leaked
SNPs of the patient as a result of different sizes of requests (from random parts
of the patient’s genome). In Fig. 9, we illustrate the number of SNPs leaked to
the MU in 100 time-slots. We observe that the number of leaked SNPs is more
than twice the number of authorized SNPs (which are within the requested range
of nucleotides). When the proposed masking technique is in place, the number of
leaked SNPs (outside the requested range) becomes 0 in Fig. 9.
Finally, we study the genomic data leakage (number of leaked nucleotides and
SNPs) when the MU tests the susceptibility of the patient [29] to a particular
disease (i.e., when the MU asks for the set of SNPs of the patient that are used to
test the corresponding disease). For this study, we use real disease markers [21].
We note that for this type of test, the size of the requested range of nucleotides (by
the MU) for a single SNP is typically 1, but the SNPs are from several parts of the
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patient’s genome. In Fig. 10, we illustrate the genomic data leakage of the patient
as a result of various disease susceptibility tests each requiring a different number
of SNPs from different parts of the patient’s genome (on the x-axis we illustrate the
number of SNPs required for each test). We again observe that the leaked SNPs, as
a result of different disease susceptibility tests, reveal privacy-sensitive data about
the patient. For example, leaked SNPs of the patient as a result of a test for the
Alzheimer’s disease could leak information about the patient’s susceptibility to
“smoking behavior” or “diabetes” (in [20], we list the nature of some important
leaked SNPs due to some susceptibility tests in Fig. 10). Similar to the previous
cases, the number of leaked nucleotides and SNPs is 0 when masking is in place.
9 Implementation and Complexity Analysis
We implemented the proposed system and assessed its storage requirement and
complexity on an Intel Core i7-2620M CPU with a 2.70 GHz processor under
Windows 7. Our implementation is in Java and it relies on the MySQL 5.5 database.
As before, for the patient’s SAM file, we used a real DNA profile [29] including
around 300 million short reads (each short read including at most 100 nucleotides)
with a coverage of 8.
We used the Salsa20 stream cipher [30] for its efficiency and security. We also
used the implementation of OPE from [31]. Finally, we used CCM mode of AES
(with key size of 256-bits) for the secure communication between the MK and the
MU by using the session key (in Section 7.2), and RSA (with key size of 2048-bits)
for the public-key encryption (Step 4 in Section 7.2). We note that the security of
the proposed scheme relies on the security of its underlying cryptographic proto-
cols: (i) Salsa20 stream cipher [30] is proven to be a semantically secure encryption
algorithm, (ii) the security of RSA relies on the problem of factoring large numbers
and the RSA problem, and (iii) the security of OPE is recently analyzed by Popa et
al. [23] to prove that the ciphertext values reveal no additional information about
the plaintext values besides their order (i.e., IND-OCPA [31]).14 As discussed, we
14 Even though we used [31] for the implementation of OPE, a more recent version of OPE is
shown to be more secure and faster [23]. We did not use the version of OPE in [23] due to the
non-availability of a public implementation, but we are planning to integrate it in the future.
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also prevent the security flaws (specific to genomic data) due to the knowledge of
the orders of the encrypted positions by mapping the positions of the short reads
to new values.
We structured the fields in the encrypted short read (in Fig. 5) as follows:
We reserved the first 8-bytes for the encrypted position of the short read (via
OPE). To save storage, we devoted the next 64-bytes of the encrypted short read
to the CS and the content of the short read. As the input size of the stream cipher
is 64-bytes, we encrypted the CS together with the content and other (header)
information of the short read using the stream cipher. That is, out of the 64-byte
input of the stream cipher, we allocated the first 20-bytes for the CS, the next 25-
bytes for the content (as each short read in the used DNA profile includes at most
100 nucleotides), and the remaining 19-bytes for the remaining information about
the short read (or padding). Finally, the last byte of the short read includes the
plaintext random salt. Consequently, we computed the storage cost as 21.6 GB per
patient. We note that stream cipher encryption does not increase the size of the
data as it is the XOR of the key stream with the plaintext. The storage overhead
(due to the proposed privacy-preserving scheme) is due to the encryption of the
positions of the short reads by using OPE. A plaintext position is around 40 bits
(depending the number of parts in Fig. 3) and an encrypted position is 8-bytes
using the implementation of OPE in [31] (an encrypted position is 40-bytes using
the more recent and secure version of OPE in [23]).
We also evaluated the computation times for different steps of the proposed
scheme. The detailed computation times of different steps of the protocol can be
found in [20]. Overall, it takes approximately 5 seconds for the MU to receive the
requested range of nucleotides of the patient (Steps 4-12) after privacy-preserving
retrieval and masking (for a range size of 100, which includes on the average 23
short reads), which shows the efficiency and practicality of the proposed scheme.
We note that the computation time of the whole process is dominated by the
retrieval of the reads at the biobank (which does not involve any cryptographic
operations). Therefore, we can easily claim that the cost of cryptographic opera-
tions is not a bottleneck for the proposed protocol.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a privacy-preserving system for the storage, re-
trieval, and processing of aligned, raw genomic data (i.e., SAM files). The proposed
scheme stores the SAM files of the patients at a biobank and lets the medical units
(hospitals or pharmaceutical companies) privately retrieve the data (they are au-
thorized for) from the biobank for genetic tests. We have shown that the proposed
scheme efficiently prevents the leakage of genomic data and preserves the genomic
privacy of the patients. We are confident that the proposed scheme will accelerate
genomic research, because clinical-trial participants will be more willing to consent
to the sequencing of their genomes if they are ensured that their genomic privacy
is preserved.
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